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Abstract (100 - 120 words) 32 
Conservation conflicts represent complex multi-layered problems which are 33 
challenging to study. We explore the utility of theoretical, experimental and 34 
constructivist approaches to games to help understand and manage these 35 
challenges. We show how these approaches can help develop theory, understand 36 
patterns in conflict and highlight potentially effective management solutions. The 37 
choice of approach should be guided by the research question and whether the 38 
focus is on testing hypotheses, predicting behaviour or engaging stakeholders. 39 
Games provide an exciting opportunity to help unravel the complexity in conflicts, 40 
whilst researchers need an awareness of the limitations and ethical constraints 41 
involved. Given the opportunities, this field will benefit from greater investment and 42 
development. 43 
 44 
 45 
 46 
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 49 
The conflict challenge 50 
 51 
Conflicts are widespread within conservation and are damaging to both conservation 52 
interests and to the livelihoods and well-being of people involved [1,2]. Such 53 
conflicts are often complex, seemingly intractable and open-ended “wicked” 54 
problems [3–5]. Whilst superficially they may appear to be about lions attacking 55 
livestock, or the impact of superabundant geese in an agricultural landscape, in 56 
reality they involve complex layers of multiple stakeholders with different interests, 57 
values, goals, and life experiences in different political, cultural and historical 58 
settings [2,6–9]. The complexity of conflicts challenges our ability to tease out critical 59 
elements, understand the dynamics of conflict and stakeholder behaviour, design 60 
effective interventions, understand how to promote engagement and build possible 61 
solutions. Traditional approaches to studying such issues have often failed to meet 62 
this challenge and in some cases have led to ineffective interventions which at worst 63 
can exacerbate existing problems [10].  64 
 65 
Games offer a potentially powerful means to disentangle this complexity and help 66 
understand conflicts and their management. In everyday usage, a game is a 67 
competitive activity defined by its rules, and is generally played for fun. However, a 68 
more formal definition is offered by game theory, which regards a game as a model 69 
of a strategic situation in which the outcome of an individual’s action also depends 70 
on the actions chosen by others[11,12]. Viewed in this way, games provide both a 71 
framework for formal analysis of conflicts and form the basis of a set of powerful 72 
research tools which can be used to clarify the key elements of a conflict, investigate 73 
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the beliefs and behaviour of the participants, examine the effects of changes to the 74 
system and engage stakeholders in productive discussion. 75 
 76 
Various approaches to studying conflict and co-operation based on games have been 77 
developed in fields related to conservation [13–17], but the games literature can 78 
seem a bit overwhelming: the characteristics, strengths and weakness of alternative 79 
approaches are not always clearly understood; they have different philosophical 80 
underpinnings; and the terminology used to describe them can be confusing for non-81 
specialists. As a result, they have not yet been widely applied to the study of 82 
conservation conflicts. 83 
 84 
We cannot hope to be comprehensive in reviewing the diversity of games here, so 85 
instead we focus on describing and differentiating between theoretical, 86 
experimental and constructivist approaches to using games that are relevant to 87 
those working in conservation. We explore how each one may contribute to our 88 
understanding and management of conflict. We start by briefly describing and 89 
illustrating the approaches with examples. We then consider the types of problems 90 
that emerge in conflict situations and how they may be addressed by the different   91 
approaches to games. From there we examine an on-going conflict to illustrate how 92 
games may help to understand and manage it. Lastly, we consider some of the 93 
general limitations and ethical issues involved in using games in conflicts and 94 
propose promising directions for future work. 95 
 96 
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Approaches to games 97 
Theoretical games are characterised by a formal mathematical analysis or simulation 98 
of players, behaviours, outcomes and rules (see Box 1). They are useful for 99 
understanding the nature of conflicts and identifying novel solutions to real-world 100 
situations of strategic conflict. For example, a typical situation concerns the joint 101 
goals of wildlife conservation and food production where protected animals have a 102 
negative impact on farmers. Such a scenario could be simplified to consider two 103 
possible strategies - for parties to cooperate, or to defect as when farmers illegally 104 
hunt or conservationists exclude local people from the benefits of tourism income. 105 
Game-theoretic analyses of such simple scenarios often seek analytic solutions [18]. 106 
For example, in the “tragedy of the commons” scenario [19], individuals seek to 107 
maximise their own payoffs, leading to long term reductions in benefits for everyone 108 
(all wild animals killed and no income from tourism). Because this problem is defined 109 
by strategic interactions among rational players, a game-theoretic perspective can 110 
be used to better understand such conflicts and potentially offer novel solutions for 111 
promoting cooperation and sustainability [20,21], such as having an agreed level of 112 
wild animals, agriculture and income from tourism.  113 
 114 
In the related fields of common pool resources, land and water management and 115 
fisheries, theoretical games have included more complex dynamic simulations, the 116 
coupling of social-ecological systems and the uncertainty that is inherent in these 117 
systems. The inclusion of both natural resource dynamics and human behaviour has 118 
improved our conceptual understanding of conflict situations [22–24], broken down 119 
the complexity of decision-making for individual stakeholder objectives [25], allowed 120 
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us to make qualitative or quantitative predictions of behaviour or other system 121 
outcomes [26] and unified case studies through common theory [20,27]. Theoretical 122 
games typically assume that simulated players follow a particular set of behaviour 123 
patterns, such as being rational decision-makers, providing a baseline for comparison 124 
with real-world behaviour [12]. However, behaviours deviating from classical 125 
economic theory are also possible [28,29]. For a detailed discussion of the use of 126 
game-theoretic approaches in conservation see [23].  127 
Strengths: Useful to probe theoretical understanding of a situation, examine the 128 
logical conclusions of assumptions about a conflict, and make predictions about the 129 
effects of changing aspects of a system. 130 
Weaknesses: Necessarily simplified; they cut humans out of the loop, so the 131 
complexity of real people in the process is lost. 132 
 133 
Experimental games are used to investigate participant behaviour in controlled 134 
strategic situations, in either the laboratory or the field [30]. Experiments based on 135 
games provide powerful tools for testing theoretical predictions about individual and 136 
group behaviour [31] and for quantifying behavioural traits, such as levels of trust 137 
and trustworthiness [32] and preferences for risk or fairness [33]. In this way, 138 
experimental games enable the investigation of responses to conservation 139 
interventions within the context of complex social dilemmas without the need to 140 
rely on theoretical assumptions, or expensive full implementation studies. They are 141 
well suited to investigations of possible conflict management strategies, enabling 142 
researchers to study their relative effectiveness in a controlled setting prior to 143 
implementation (See Box 2). This approach is particularly useful when participants in 144 
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a game are themselves stakeholders in the conflict the game seeks to model since 145 
behaviour has been shown to vary with factors such as cultural and educational 146 
background and familiarity with the situation being represented [34]. The application 147 
of experimental game approaches with real stakeholders thus increases the 148 
likelihood that results of experiments are applicable to real world resources, 149 
institutions, and people [31]. 150 
Strengths: Useful for testing theories and practical interventions that would be 151 
difficult, expensive or unethical to test at 'reality scale' and to quantify behavioural 152 
traits. 153 
Weaknesses: Necessarily simplified, although not as much as theoretical games; 154 
Design and implementation requires attention to detail so that a truly fair 155 
comparison is made among treatments. Outcomes can be sensitive to small changes 156 
in the experimental design. 157 
 158 
The constructivist approach requires games to be designed and used in iterative 159 
processes to understand conflict situations and to help stakeholders come up with 160 
solutions [35]. These games can be card games, board games or role-playing games, 161 
and they are used to foster dialogue and build trust among stakeholders [36]. As for 162 
experimental games, constructivism integrates players inside the game – bringing in 163 
their needs, desires, beliefs and intentions, allowing their behaviour in the game to 164 
represent differences in knowledge and values. The difference from other 165 
approaches, however, is that here the players are given freedom to explore a range 166 
of possible outcomes in strategic situations, so they can reframe the problem and 167 
the game, and create new options not initially contemplated by the research team 168 
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[35](Box 3). As a result the capacity to learn and anticipate are integral to the 169 
behaviour observed within a game [37]. In conservation conflict contexts, these 170 
games often have a multi-agent system structure, with a landscape, resources, and 171 
stakeholders, interactions within and among these components, and explicit 172 
representation given to the cognitive capacities of the agents [38]. This approach is 173 
exemplified by the work of the Companion Modelling community 174 
(www.commod.org). 175 
Strengths: Flexible enough to allow for a wide range of human behaviour; useful to 176 
establish dialogue, help people understand different viewpoints and agree a shared 177 
understanding of a conflict. 178 
Weaknesses: Documentation, analysis, replication and synthesis are all challenging. 179 
 180 
How can games be used to address questions about conflicts?  181 
A number of issues that emerge from research on conflicts are pertinent to games 182 
[2] (Table 1). First, there is a need to find generalities from the numerous case 183 
studies and build relevant theory. For example, we might want to develop 184 
hypotheses for how cooperation can develop in dynamic ecosystems that typically 185 
have a high degree of uncertainty and significant fluctuations in resources [39]. 186 
When mapping conflicts, there is a need to explore the underlying patterns and 187 
behaviour of conflicts – how they emerge and how they change over time, and when 188 
they switch from conflict to cooperation [40,41]. In addition, understanding conflict 189 
relies on mapping the underlying stakeholder values, emotions, interests and 190 
positions and how these aspects affect behaviour in conflicts [42–46]. Moving into 191 
conflict management, a widespread issue lies in understanding the impact of 192 
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different types of interventions on stakeholder behaviour and on the level of 193 
conflict. Such interventions can include both specific technical measures such as 194 
compensation schemes or lethal control, or interventions focused on trust and 195 
relationships, dialogue processes, governance and institutions [47–55]. Lastly, a 196 
critical issue lies in the importance of dialogue and engagement in promoting 197 
listening, understanding and the development of solutions among stakeholders.  198 
 199 
All three approaches to using games can provide useful insight into each of these 200 
areas of conflict research (Table 1), and the choice between them should be guided 201 
by the specific research question and context in which they will be applied. However, 202 
some approaches tend to suit certain objectives. For example, experimental 203 
approaches are well suited to exploring how an intervention might alter stakeholder 204 
behaviour in a conflict, whilst constructivist approaches are useful when exploring 205 
solutions with stakeholders. It is also worth pointing out that synergies can arise by 206 
using combinations of games, such as experimental and constructivist approaches 207 
[56]. 208 
To further guide the choice of approaches, it is useful to ask whether the main aim of 209 
the game is to test specific hypotheses, predict behaviour or to engage stakeholders 210 
(Figure 1).  211 
 212 
Approaching a live conflict – geese in agricultural landscapes  213 
To illustrate the utility of alternative approaches, we consider how games could be 214 
used to illuminate different facets of the conflict over rapidly increasing geese 215 
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populations (Box 4). Most populations of geese in Europe (14 of 17 populations of 7 216 
species) have grown from threatened to super-abundant over the last 60 years [68]. 217 
These geese often graze in intensively managed agricultural fields leading to conflict 218 
with farming objectives [69,70]. Management strategies and policies have failed to 219 
adapt to this increasing problem, causing frustration among stakeholders, and 220 
reinforcing polarisation and conflicts [71]. Games can provide insight into the 221 
understanding and management of this conflict in several ways.  222 
 223 
General limitations & ethics  224 
Games have enormous potential to provide insight, but they are not a panacea. One 225 
of the main limitations is that, as for all models of reality, they simplify complex 226 
situations and it is hard to choose which aspects of a situation can be safely ignored. 227 
In addition, games can give the illusion of representing real-world outcomes, yet 228 
they cannot predict with certainty what will happen when the stakes are real. A 229 
particular concern about external validity arises in situations where the payoffs used 230 
in a game are considerably lower than in real-life [31,72]. Similarly, there are issues 231 
of internal validity - are the decisions being made by game participants the same as 232 
those a researcher believes are being made? [72]. These questions need to be 233 
considered throughout the process of developing, implementing and interpreting a 234 
game. Debriefing sessions after experimental and constructivist games with the 235 
participants are valuable in helping address these issues. 236 
 237 
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While games can seem innocuous fun, when played with stakeholders they can raise 238 
serious ethical issues: from framing and game design through implementation and 239 
publishing the results. For example, at the design stage, it is easy for researchers to 240 
plan a game in such a way that the outcome of the game into a foregone conclusion. 241 
To avoid this pitfall, the community of Companion Modelling has drafted a charter of 242 
conduct [35]. In addition, early and thorough testing is essential. Game designers 243 
need to consider how to capture and represent sensitive behaviours, such as 244 
corruption, poaching or reprisals. Designs and tools are available to avoid revealing 245 
individual information to other players, or even to the research team [73]. 246 
Stakeholders might also question whether games are serious enough to warrant the 247 
interest of busy professionals with a reputation to lose [37].  248 
 249 
Payments involving cash or other tangible goods are sometimes used in games 250 
[73,74]. These approaches need to be thought through before implementation. 251 
Payments linked to individual performance within games are supposed to give 252 
players an incentive to focus harder, but also incentivise acting more selfishly, 253 
potentially undermining the basis of collaboration [75]. In certain contexts, this 254 
would improve understanding of the system. In others, it could be detrimental, 255 
particularly if the incentives are trivial compared to the costs that stakeholders incur 256 
in real life.  257 
 258 
During certain games, the role of the participants will evolve, and researchers need 259 
to reflect on how much power they are willing to give to participants and how to 260 
deal with the power asymmetries among stakeholders and between stakeholders 261 
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and the research team [76]. In fact, even playing a game can affect the system, so 262 
researchers need to exercise reflexivity to be aware of any potential unintended 263 
outcomes of such interventions [67,77]. Games with participants can also spark 264 
conflicts but these are generally inherent to the situation being explored. Games 265 
simply bring these processes to light so that the conflict can be managed instead of 266 
being suppressed by the power structure of the status quo [78]. Nevertheless, they 267 
require careful facilitation to manage expectations and deal with emerging issues.  268 
 269 
The ethical considerations of publishing games that involve stakeholders are also 270 
important. Participants should be informed how data will be used, who will have 271 
access to it, and in what form, particularly if it is identifiable to a particular player. As 272 
with other empirical approaches to investigating sensitive behaviour, anonymising 273 
individual behaviour might not, in itself, be sufficient to ensure that game 274 
participants are protected from harm [79].  275 
 276 
Future Directions 277 
Games offer exciting opportunities to help guide the understanding and 278 
management of conflicts over biodiversity and conservation. This field of conflict 279 
research is focused on case studies with limited efforts to draw out the generalities 280 
[80]. Games have the potential to help find and explore the generalities, such as the 281 
consistent findings in ultimatum games of concern for others – as opposed to the 282 
pure self-interest that is often assumed [11] and consider how they might fit in 283 
different contexts. We consider a number of outstanding questions in Table 2.  284 
 285 
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Concluding remarks 286 
Conflicts are ubiquitous, persistent and damaging. Their complexity and critical 287 
human dimensions mean that they are challenging to study and manage. Games 288 
have the potential to address these problems and provide genuine insight into a 289 
wide range of issues around how we understand and manage conflicts. Moreover, 290 
games also have the potential to be fun. There are different types of games available 291 
to address different questions and situations – from theoretical games to ones 292 
involving the active participation of stakeholders. Given their potential to help 293 
develop theory, understand patterns in conflict and highlight potentially effective 294 
management solutions, we suggest this field is ripe for development, given proper 295 
awareness of the limitations and ethical constraints. 296 
 297 
  298 
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Box 1 An example of a theoretical game developed to address a fisheries conflict and 299 
the role of cooperation. 300 
 301 
 302 
 303 
 304 
 305 
 306 
 307 
 308 
 309 
 310 
 311 
Tilman et al. [24] recently investigated conflict within a social-ecological fishery 312 
system by constructing a mathematical model of the fishery as a common-pool 313 
resource system. Fishers can increase their own profits by maximising their catch, 314 
but the individual gain achieved by doing so contributes to long-term depletion of 315 
total fisheries stock. The authors looked at this case study using game theory, 316 
defining a 'socially-optimal' fishing strategy that could be enforced by allowing 317 
fishers to ostracise one another when over-harvesting occurs. In the mathematical 318 
model, fishers could either join a cooperative or they could harvest independently 319 
which increased profit, but came at the cost of being ostracised by the cooperative. 320 
Further, the punitive power of the cooperative increased with its size, and 321 
ostracising independent harvesters also incurred a cost to the fishers in the 322 
cooperative. 323 
 324 
Tilman et al. [24] modelled the dynamics of fish biomass and the fraction of fishers 325 
that joined the cooperative. Fishers were assumed to be rational agents who joined 326 
or not based on whichever choice maximised their profit. They demonstrated the 327 
conceptually general, counter-intuitive result that social ostracism can promote 328 
cooperation and ultimately sustainability when individuals within a cooperative 329 
harvest at a rate that is higher than what would otherwise be optimal for maximising 330 
the long-term rate of resource harvest overall. This is because a higher harvest rate 331 
for individuals within a cooperative can discourage independent harvesters from 332 
invading, and ultimately leads to more sustainable long-term harvests. Hence, this 333 
theoretical approach suggested a novel, generally applicable, way to address 334 
conservation conflict. 335 
 336 
 337 
 338 
 339 
 340 
 341 
 342 
 343 
 344 
 345 
Figure 1 from [19] showing that 
cooperation and ultimately sustainability is 
best promoted at a higher total effort of 
harvest (Nash EQ) than would be optimal 
(Social Optimum) for maximising long-term 
profit (dashed lines). Figure reproduced 
with permission from the journal. 
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 346 
Box 2. An example of an experimental game developed to predict the outcomes of 347 
incentive-based interventions on illegal resource use in Cambodia.  348 
 349 
 350 
 351 
 352 
 353 
 354 
 355 
 356 
 357 
 358 
 359 
In Cambodia, illegal resource use inside protected areas is common, with high rates 360 
of hunting and land clearance in particular leading to conflict between local people 361 
and conservation authorities. One solution that has been developed to mitigate this 362 
conflict is the introduction of incentive-based interventions to promote compliance 363 
with land use and resource access zones. To evaluate the potential behavioural 364 
impact of these interventions, Travers et al. [65] used an experimental game 365 
adapted from the common-pool resource game developed by Ostrom et al. [20]. To 366 
aid understanding, the game was framed around the harvesting of fish from a pond 367 
within the protected area. Each participant was given the option of harvesting fish 368 
from this pond or choosing to leave fish unharvested for future use. Payoffs were set 369 
such that harvested fish were worth considerably more to the individual harvesting 370 
than if they had been left in the pond. However, the collective value of fish left in the 371 
pond was greater than the payoff an individual received from harvesting. This set up 372 
a social dilemma in which the optimum strategy for players who wanted to maximise 373 
their own payoff was to harvest as many fish as they could, whereas the social 374 
optimum was to leave all fish in the pond.  375 
 376 
A number of alternative management strategies were investigated, including fines if 377 
participants were caught harvesting too many fish and individual or collective 378 
rewards for keeping harvests within predefined thresholds. The most effective 379 
interventions at reducing fish harvest were those that encouraged participants to 380 
self-organise, through the use of incentives that were conditional on group 381 
behaviour or allocated to individuals by the group. Although the treatments 382 
considered in the game were stylised versions of those applied in reality, the findings 383 
provided valuable insight into the features of incentive initiatives predicted to have 384 
the greatest impact on encouraging sustainable use of resources and mitigating 385 
conflict between local people and conservation authorities. This has led to increased 386 
efforts to promote the development of local institutions and the provision of 387 
collective incentives to local communities.  388 
 389 
 390 
 391 
 392 
Photos by H. Travers 
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 393 
 394 
Box 3. An example of a role-playing game to explore the likely influence of policy 395 
change on an agro-forestry system in India  396 
 397 
 398 
The landscape of Kodagu, in India’s Western Ghats is a mosaic of rice fields, forest 399 
fragments and coffee farms. Coffee is produced under complex, multi-storeyed 400 
agroforestry systems, but farmers are replacing a diverse, native canopy cover with 401 
the fast growing, introduced Silver Oak Grevillea robusta [85,86]. Whereas the 402 
harvesting of native species is controlled, silver oak can be logged and traded [87]. 403 
For years, coffee farmers and their representatives have been demanding full 404 
ownership rights over trees on their land [85]. These demands have been opposed 405 
by the Forest Department for fear of the environmental impact. Farmer 406 
representatives have denied that the granting of rights would result in a loss of tree 407 
cover or conversion [88]. This polarized debate has led to a long-lasting standoff. 408 
 409 
A role-playing game was developed with academics, representatives of the Central 410 
Coffee Board of India, local conservation organisations, private coffee trading 411 
companies, and community leaders in eight separate workshops across the district. 412 
Through workshops and interviews, the game was co-constructed and explored two 413 
scenarios. The business as usual scenario had rules for selling native trees mimicking 414 
the restrictions in place. The tree rights scenario saw these restrictions lifted. These 415 
game sessions were recorded and used as a basis for discussion. 416 
 417 
The results suggested that farmers would increase their income were they to receive 418 
full rights. But we also observed that in such situations they decided to hasten, 419 
rather than reverse, the conversion to Silver Oak. This strategy was contrary to 420 
expectations that farmers would retain native forest, but instead, the faster rotation 421 
of Silver Oak trumped the multiple values of the native trees.  422 
 423 
The lessons from this role-play game were bittersweet. The game revealed system 424 
components and processes that had been identified in none of the policy narratives 425 
of the concerned parties. These represented hidden pitfalls that would have plunged 426 
the system into a non-desired state had the current policy change been 427 
implemented as initially designed. However, these lessons could not be transferred 428 
to the policy process, in part because the findings undermined the initial position of 429 
our main partners, the coffee farmers themselves. 430 
  431 
Photos by C.A.Garcia 
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Box 4. Examples of how three approaches to games could be used in a current 432 
conflict over geese impacts on agricultural systems in Sweden. 433 
 434 
Background. Increasing numbers of 435 
protected geese in Europe are causing 436 
impacts on agricultural production [68]. In 437 
Sweden, the government pays 438 
compensation and supports the scaring of 439 
most goose species, but as populations 440 
increase, farmers are asking for more 441 
lethal control.  442 
 443 
 444 
Theoretical game example. Objective – predict the impact of management 445 
strategies on collaborations and goose populations. First, map the time series of 446 
goose numbers, management actions and players’ interactions over time, to develop 447 
a modelling framework within which game theory can be applied. Then simulate the 448 
actions and players’ interactions using mathematical or computational techniques to 449 
find actions that reduce conflict. Such a game could enable predictions as to which 450 
actions will lead to collaboration and a sustainable goose population under changing 451 
conditions of governmental budget changes.  452 
 453 
Experimental game example. Objective – test a hypothesis that farmers are more 454 
likely to cooperate in a goose management scheme, which uses a lethal rather than 455 
non-lethal control method. The game setting would be an idealised landscape in 456 
which geese move among farms and damage crops. Players would be farmers who 457 
choose between lethal or non-lethal measures using a cash endowment they receive 458 
in each round. These measures would only be effective if the sum of investments 459 
reached a predetermined threshold. If too few invest, no protection would be 460 
achieved. Such an approach would allow researchers to test players' willingness to 461 
participate in different measures and examine the effect of collective discussions on 462 
individual decision-making. Post-game debriefing sessions would provide a greater 463 
understanding of the factors influencing farmer behaviour.  464 
 465 
Constructivist games example. Objective – engage stakeholders to explore lethal vs. 466 
non-lethal interventions under changing economic resources. This game would be 467 
played over a co-developed idealised landscape. Stakeholders would build and play 468 
the game to explore the strategies they would employ under lethal and non-lethal 469 
action scenarios, interacting with each other and the resources in the landscape. The 470 
game would allow the compatibility and sustainability of actions over space and time 471 
to be assessed. The design and gaming process and post-game reflections 472 
would facilitate a shared understanding of the conflict among participants, enabling 473 
an explorations of the outcomes and stakeholder acceptance for measures and 474 
the development of innovative interventions. 475 
 476 
 477 
  478 
Photo by Johan Månsson 
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Table 2. Outstanding questions 
 
1) How to scale up to the management of a large scale conflict?  
Experimental and constructivist games are often played with a relatively small 
sample of the population of interest, we need to understand how best to scale-up. 
One approach is to run games with decision-makers, to provide them with the 
insight into the system and its management. Alternatively, one could run games with 
trainers, so that they can then play the game more widely with key stakeholders. 
Digital games also offer one way of extending the reach of these approaches [81,82]. 
2) How does one win a conservation conflict game?  
All games define the winning conditions precisely: eg last man standing, or first one 
to achieve a certain amount of points. Given the complexity inherent to conservation 
conflicts, it is likely to be insufficient to only consider the monetary payoffs of 
different actions because the players may have conflicting interests that cannot be 
measured using the same unit of pay-off. For example, the value of a lion saved from 
being killed to conservationists in the USA cannot be easily compared to the value to 
a farmer of livestock lost to a lion. Other attributes, such as safety, reputation, and 
symbolic values are also important. To accommodate non-monetary attributes, we 
need to go beyond the ordinal rankings of pay-offs [22,23] and consider new 
approaches to determining pay-offs, such as integrating multi-criteria decision 
analysis and scenario planning analysis [25,83].  
 
 
 
Outstanding Questions
3) How to address uncertainty in pay-offs in conservation conflicts?  
Predicting people’s decision making under increasing uncertainty is paramount for 
future conservation and conflict management [84]. Game-theoretic approaches in 
conservation have mostly focused on the mathematical analysis and have so far 
ignored the dynamic nature of ecosystems (e.g. weather differences between years) 
and thus the uncertainty in pay-offs these dynamics create [23]. Yet games offer the 
potential to explore how people respond and change their behaviour according to 
implementation uncertainty, such as associated with conservation policies or 
incentives, or in situations of process uncertainty, such as a rapidly changing world. 
An important advantage of games is that these uncertainties are not tested for each 
person in isolation but in direct interaction with other players in the community. 
Games could be set up so that players experience challenges associated with 
agricultural food shortage or the international protection of species that provided 
traditional sources of wild meat, thereby mimicking situations of conservation 
conflict [59]. 
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Figure 1. Decision tree highlighting the situations 
under which the different approaches to games 
are favoured. Experimental approaches are a good 
fit when addressing the objectives in Table 1 
through testing hypotheses, and constructivist 
approaches are best suited when addressing the 
objectives through engagement. If the aim is to 
address the objectives through making predictions 
about future behaviour, then the most appropriate 
approach will depend on two things: first, whether 
or not there is a reasonable model of the players’ 
decision-making process, and second, whether the 
main interest is in the system or the stakeholders. 
If there is knowledge of how people choose 
between a small set of actions then theoretical 
games will be most useful for predicting the 
behaviour of both systems and stakeholders. 
However, if there is no reasonable model of 
decision-making, then constructivist approaches 
are likely to be most helpful at predicting system 
behaviour, and experimental games are likely to be 
most helpful at predicting stakeholder behaviour.
Figure
Table 1: Suggestions about how different approaches to games could be used to 
address objectives relevant to understanding and managing conservation conflicts. 
These suggestions are illustrative in nature and are not intended to be exhaustive or 
mutually exclusive. Each suggestion is accompanied by a reference to a study where 
this type of approach to games was used to address comparable objectives in a 
related field. 
 
 Approach  
Objective  Theoretical  
e.g. game theoretic 
mathematical or computer 
simulation modelling 
Experimental  
e.g. common pool resource and 
public goods games in lab and 
field 
Constructivist  
e.g. role playing games and 
companion modelling in lab and 
field  
Develop theory 
about 
conservation 
conflict in a 
changing 
environment 
Relevance of approach: 
To explore the logical 
consequences of theories of 
conflict 
 
Comparable example: 
Exploring whether social 
ostracism can promote 
cooperation and sustainability 
in fisheries harvesting, 
assuming rational agents  
[24] (Box 1).  
Relevance of approach: 
To test assumptions about 
behaviour in conflicts and look 
for generalities 
 
Comparable example: 
Testing how environmental 
stochasticity and trust affect 
cooperation to mitigate 
climate-change [57].  
 
Relevance of approach: 
To elicit the insights of 
stakeholders about the nature 
of conflicts 
 
Comparable example: 
Eliciting stakeholders’ reported 
behavioural strategies in a 
natural resource management 
and conservation setting [36]. 
Understand how 
conflicts emerge, 
evolve and 
resolve 
Relevance of approach: 
To examine the conditions 
under which conflicts are likely 
and suggest how they might be 
changed to encourage 
cooperation. 
 
Comparable example: 
Analysing the history of 
environmental conflict, 
identifying the structure and 
actions (e.g. enforcement) of 
the conflict and predicting 
possible solutions [58].  
Relevance of approach: 
To test the role of specific 
factors in promoting 
cooperation or conflict  
 
 
 
Comparable example: 
Testing the effects of fear and  
environmental uncertainty on 
co-operation between nations 
with respect to climate change 
action [59]. 
Relevance of approach: 
To support dialogue and shared 
learning to co-identify the roots 
of and solutions to conflict 
 
 
 
Comparable example: 
Building a shared 
representation of farmers’ 
interactions with a protected 
area to allow for the 
negotiation of uncertainties and 
risks [60]. 
Understand how 
values, interests 
and positions 
affect stakeholder 
behaviour 
Relevance of approach: 
To predict conflict from values 
and norms 
 
 
Comparable example:  
Predicting the effect of a social 
norm of fairness on forest 
conservation [61]. 
 
Relevance of approach: 
To test how individual and 
institutional characteristics 
affect behaviour in conflicts 
 
Comparable example:   
Investigating how personal 
norms and other individual 
characteristics influence 
cooperative behaviour amongst 
fishermen [62]. 
Relevance of approach: 
To facilitate understanding of 
behaviour and social learning in 
conflicts. 
 
Comparable example:   
Revealing the processes leading 
to overgrazing and providing a 
platform for sharing 
stakeholder views, knowledge, 
and perceptions [63]  
Identify how 
interventions 
affect stakeholder 
behaviour and 
conflict 
Relevance of approach: 
To predict behavioural 
responses to different 
interventions 
 
Comparable example:  
Investigating effects of 
payments and sanctions on 
poaching and importance of 
individual-level heterogeneity 
Relevance of approach: 
To test behavioural responses 
to different interventions 
 
 
Comparable example:  
Investigating the effect of 
incentive based payments on 
stakeholder behaviour amongst 
Relevance of approach: 
To explore behavioural 
responses to different 
interventions with stakeholders 
 
Comparable example:  
Revealing the effect of policy 
change on stakeholder 
behaviour in coffee plantations 
(Box 3) 
Key Table Click here to download Key Table Redpath et al. Conflict
Games - Table 1 resubmission.docx
and strategic decision-making 
in design of interventions. [64] 
 
fishermen in Cambodia. (Box 2) 
[65] 
Promote 
engagement 
amongst 
stakeholders to 
understand 
conflicts and 
develop solutions. 
Relevance of approach: 
To explore possible  outcomes 
of conflict under different 
scenarios 
 
Comparable example:   
Simulating fishery 
management in order to 
explore effectiveness of 
management options with 
stakeholders [66]. 
Relevance of approach: 
To encourage reflection by 
participants, promote dialogue 
and test solutions 
 
Comparable example:   
Encouraging communities to 
reflect about the incentives and 
strategic interactions that can 
lead to conflict over resource 
use [67]  
Relevance of approach: 
To promote and support co-
management  
 
Comparable example:   
Bringing local communities and 
protected area managers 
together to support the 
collaborative production of 
effective management plans. 
[60]. 
 
 
